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After having defined and explained the goals ôf in-
vestment-wages, the author establishes their social and éco-
nomie framework and gives an example drawn from the 
West-German construction industry. 
What are investment-wages and what is their aim ? 
Investment-wages in their broadest sensé are that portion of workers' 
wages which cannot be spent for consumption for a certain time *, because 
they are invested on their behalf on the capital side of the economy. 
Discussions about the idea of investment-wages in Gennany hâve shown 
that the basic theory can be applied in a multitude of forms and variations. 
The abovementioned définition suggests the investment of a part of the 
current wages of the employée. Sometimes called « subtractive investment-
wages >, this type of investment-wages would diminish the current nomi-
nal income of the employée, but this is only of theoretical interest. In 
practice, what has been discussed is an « additive » type of investment-
wages. This means that the contribution to the capital side, or the 
renounced consumption, or the temporary savings, are obtained from 
increased wages. 
Investment-wages are aimed at2 
increasing the wealth (assets, pro-
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1
 WEDDIGEN, W., Die wirtschaftlichen Folgen des Investiv-Lohns, (Duncker/ 
Humblot : Berlin, 1964) p. 9. 
2
 KOLBINGER, J., Vermôgensbildung in Arbeitnehmerhand-Werdegang und Sinn-
gebung einer Idée, in : Festschrift fiir Goetz Briefs, J. Broermann and Ph. Herder-
Dorneich, Eds. (Duncker/Humblot : Berlin, 1968) pp. 468-472. 
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perty3) of employées in order to bring them increased security. Besides 
this aim, with its accent on the individual, the investment-wages plan also 
pursues a social goal : that of permitting ail members of the economy 
to share the national product in such a way that the différences in income 
and property are successively reduced. Wide-spread, evenly distributed 
accumulation of property is aimed at in order to minimize the différences 
between social classes, to protect society from harmful, radical struggles 
between property owners and non-owners, and, thereby, to make indus-
trialized society less vulnérable to communistic agitation. As the history 
of the distribution of wealth in West-Germany shows, voluntary, individual 
saving has not led to the employées' accumulation of an increasing share 
of the total amount of property. The « rich » employers become richer 
more quickly than the other members of the economy ; the gap between 
the employers and the employées is growing wider. In view of the fact 
that voluntary saving is obviously not effective enough, part of the wage 
increase should not be paid out, since it would be another incentive for 
spending, but be retained and thus converted into long-term property4. 
Temporary and compulsory individual saving seems to be the indispensi-
ble price of starting a « capitaliste » éducation of the employées. But 
this price is only worth paying if within the économie process the advan-
tages of « investment-wages » exceed the disadvantages. 
The chief criterion for evaluating investment-wages is taken to be 
their consistency with principles and functional features of the économie 
theory which prevails in West-Germany — the so-called « Soziale Mark-
twirtschaft », i.e., social market economy. Under Part II, « The Social and 
Economie Framework », we shall first describe empirical background 
of investment-wages, and subsequently deal with the principles and func-
tional pattern of the social market economy as their theoretical back-
3
 In German the use of the standard économie term « Vermôgensbildung » 
became more and more popular in the context of investment-wages and similar 
programs. We will generally translate this term as « property accumulation ». As 
noted by the translater of Accumulation of Assets for the Worker by G. LEBER 
(Schriftenreihe der Industriegewerkschaft Bau-Steine-Erden, Frankfurt/M, p. 10) : 
« the 'property' involved is not necessarily real property, but could be better unders-
tood as 'individual capital assets'. In this vein one might coin an English équivalent 
of 'Vermôgensbildung' by using the phrase 'personal assets formation', but this 
awkward phrase would hâve little meaning to most persons. Germany has had a 
far-reaching social insurance System for décades... to many non-German readers 
at least, this pension coverage would be considered as a personal asset of considé-
rable value. In gênerai, however, compulsory insurance benefits of this type do 
not in Germany fall within the framework of 'property accumulation'. » 
4
 MEINHOLD, H., « Some Comments on Invested Wages », in : G. LEBER, 
Accumulation of Assets for the Worker, op. cit., p. 91. 
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ground. In the Part III, following thèse fundamental remarks, we shall 
tum to a considération of the first concrète application of investment-
wages in the West-German construction industry. The first part of this 
chapter contains the pubhcly presented and openly discussed proposai 
of the construction workers' union 5, as well as the outcome of the ensuing 
collective bargaining process. The second part of the chapter attempts 
to describe and evaluate the effects of the collective agreement — insofar 
as such effects hâve become visible up to the time of writing. 
The social and économie framework 
THE EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND 
Two years after the foundation of the social market economy in 
1948 the Independent Scientific Council for Economie Affairs of the 
Government concluded that the distribution of property was « inéquit-
able ». Since that time various statistical investigations hâve been made 
of the distribution of private property. The last reports made by économie 
experts before the Leber-Plan was launched, and to which the Plan re-
fers 6, cover the period between 1950 and 1960, were carried out by Cari 
Fôhl7 and O. de la Chevallerie8, and published in 1964. Both reports, 
but especially the survey by Fôhl, which was initiated by order of the 
fédéral government, provoked wide public discussion. Both the central 
association of employers and the central fédération of employées consi-
dered the report and rejected some of its statistical methods and results. 
But this mainly revealed, as predicted by Fôhl, difficulties in gaining the 
représentative and detailed statistical material. The gênerai trends por-
trayed by Fôhl's report were not challenged. 
Even before the publication of the Fôhl report, the Fédéral Ministry 
of Labour (Bundesministerium fiir Arbeit und Sozialordnung) had asked 
Wilhelm Krelle to research the économie possibilities and conséquences 
of profit-sharing on the basis of Systems which operate beyond the level 
5 The so-called « Leber-Plan ». At that time Georg Leber was président of 
the construction worker's union ; at the time of writing he is Fédéral Minister of 
Transport. 
6 Cf. LEBER, G., Accumulation of Assets for the Worker, op. cit., p. 17. 
7 FÔHL, C , Kreislaufanalytische Untersuchungen der Vermôgensbildung, 
(Mohr : Tiibingen, 1964). 
8 D E LA CHEVALLERIE, O., Die Entwicklung der Einkommensverteilung in der 
Bundesrepublik, Ed. : Deutsche Volkswirtschaftliche Gesellschaft e.V. (Leske : 
Opladen, 1964) Band 22. 
366 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 26, NO 2 
of individual enterprises, and which stimulate the accumulation of property 
on the part of employées. Krelle's investigation9, conducted in collabo-
ration with Schunck and Siebke, made use of statistical material of the 
period from 1950 to 1963. This investigation, published in 1968, still 
represents the latest thorough treatment of property distribution. In 
gênerai, it confirms the trends described by Fôhl. In the following, we 
shall briefly illustrate this trend 10. 
The Primary Distribution of Income between 
Employer s n and Employées 
The net average income for 1955 and 1959 of various économie 
classes in Germany is shown in Table I. 
TABLE I 
Net-Average Income of Privâte Households in West-Germany in 
1955 and 1959, subdivised by Socio-Economie Classes 
Income per year in DM 
per private 
budget 
per member of the 
household depending 
on a single budget 
1955 1959 1955 1959 
Employers 10,780 15,300 2,755 3,910 
Employées : 
Salary Earners 8,010 10,530 2,665 3,470 
Wage Earners 6,255 8,305 1,935 2,555 
Pensioners 4,075 5,875 1,885 2,715 
SOURCE : G. Gôsike, Verteiîung und Schichtung der Einkommen der privât en 
Haushalte in der Bundesrepublik 1955 bis 1959, in : Sonderheft 66A, 
Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, (Berlin : 1963), p. 18. 
9 W. KRELLE, J. SCHUNCK, J. SIEBKE, Uberbetriebliche Ertragsbeteiligung der 
Arbeitnehmer, 2 Volumes (Mohr : Tùbingen, 1968). 
10
 The following statistics cover the period from 1950 to the first collective 
agreement pertaining to investment wages (Jan. 1, 1966). More récent figures wilî 
be given below. 
11
 Included under the heading « employers » are ail « self-employed » or 
« independent » persons, in contrast to the « dépendent » employées. 
ÏNVESTMENT-WAGES : THEORY AND APPLICATION 367 
In 1959 37% of employers and 18% of salary earners, but only 
9% of wage earners had a monthly sum of DM 1,200 or more at their 
disposai. 14.5% of ail employers, 37.7% of ail salary earners and 52% 
of ail wage earners made 600 DM or less per month in 1959 12. 
Within the income-strata there is a trend from the lower to the 
middle and higher income classes. In 1959 (1955) about 6% (15%) 
had an income under 200 DM per month, but already 2.5% (1%) had 
an income above 2,000 DM. The most fréquent income was 360 DM 
in 1955, 470 DM in 1959. Among wage earners the modal class was 
in the range between 300 and 700 DM ; while 50% of the employers 
had an income above 1,000 DM per month 13. 
About 18 million employées gained an 82% increase of their net 
income between 1950 and 1960 ; 4 million employers gained an increase 
of 356% — from 4,800 million to 21,900 million14. In spite of the 
activity of the unions wages continued to account for only about 60% 
of the national income. The « wage-rate », Le., the employées' share of 
the total national income, stayed around this « Magic 60 » for about 40 
years : 1925 — 59.9% ; 1929 — 61.9% ; 1932 — 61.8% ; 1950 — 
59.2% ; 1956 — 60.4% ; 1960 — 61.0% 15. During this period of an 
approximately constant « wage-rate » the number of employées was in-
creasing (from 1950 to 1960 about 5.5 million more individuals were 
employed) while the number of employers was decreasing (about 600,000 
less) 16. 
Beginning in 1961 the « magie 60% » hâve been exceeded : the 
employées' share of the total national income rose to 62.5% in 1961, 
63.9% in 1962, 64.5% in 1963, 64.6% in 1964, and to 65.4% in 
1965 n , while the employers' share decreased from 39.2% (1960) to 
34.6% (1965) 18. 
12
 BOSCH, W., Vermôgensstreuung (Quelle & Meyer : Heidelberg, 1965). 
13
 FÔHL, C , Kreislaufanalytische Untersuchung der Vermôgensbildung, op. 
cit., p. 65. 
14
 HAUSSLER, E., Jedem sein Eigentum (Seewald : Stuttgart, 1965), p. 82. 
15 -ibid., p. 81. 
16 FÔHL, op. cit., pp. 47-49. 
17 Statistisches Jahrbuch fiir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland Ed. : Statistis-
ches Bundesamt, (Stuttgart, Kohlhammer 1969) p. 496. 
18
 Statistisches Jahrbuch fiir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, op. cit., p. 503. 
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The Distribution of Saving and Property 
by Socio-Economie Groups 
According to Fohl private households accumulated net property 
to the value of 152,700 million DM in the years from 1950 to 1959. The 
breakdown by différent private households is shown in Table II : 
TABLE II 
Property Accumulation by Private Households in West-Germany 
from 1950 until 1959, subdivided by Socio-Economie Classes 
No. of Total Accumulation 
Households Accumulation per Household 
in millions in Million DM in DM 
Wage Earners 5.8 9,300 1,600 
Salary Earners 3.6 21,700 6,000 
Pensioners 5.0 9,600 1,950 
Employers 2.8 37,500 13,000 
Total 17.2 78,100 4,500 
Undistributed Profit of Non-Corporated Enterprises, which 
Preponderantly can be Added to the Income of the 
Employers : 74,600 
Total Property Accumulation 152,700 
SOURCE : Fôhl, C , op. cit., p. 63. 
This table shows that only 2.8 million (or 17%) of ail private 
households accounted for 75% of the total accumulation of property. 
A second separate investigation 19 revealed the same tendency : in 1959 
18.9 million employées saved 6,100 million DM ; 3.2 million employers 
saved 6,800 million DM. This accounts for an average of 322 DM per 
employée and 2,125 DM per employer. In the same year there were 
accumulated 10,800 million DM of undistributed profit in non-corporated 
enterprises. This amounts to 5,500 DM per employer, or 17 times the 
per capita amount of the employées. The undistributed profit of the 
corporate entities for the same year is estimated at 6,600 million DM. 
There is no doubt that only a small amount of stocks is owned by em-
ployées. Therefore, this undistributed profit of the corporations must 
also be added to the property of the employers. 
19 FÔHL, C , op. cit., pp. 64-66. 
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If we calculate the ratio between savings and income, then in 1959 
the saving-rate of the wage earners reached 4.3%, that of the pensioners 
4.7%, and that of the salary earners 10.8% 20. The total saving-rate of 
ail private income earners has levelled off since 1958 at around 9% 21. 
In addition to the voluntary saving-rate we must not forget the compulsory 
savings under West-Germany's social security System. 14% of the gross 
income of the employées is set aside for pensions 22, thus diminishing their 
capacity for saving. 
The investigation made by Krelle, Schunck and Siebke, covering the 
period from 1950 to 1963, summarizes the history of property structure 
as follows :2 3 
Of the total amount of property accumulated by private households 
between 1950 and 1963, 56% fell to the employées and pensioners (wage 
earners: 17%, salary earners: 19%, civil servants: 7%, pensioners: 
13%), and 44% fell to the employers (farmers : 6%, others : 38%). 
The per capita accumulation of property from 1950 to 1963 amounted 
to 3,200 DM for the employées and pensioners (wage earners : 2,100 DM, 
salary earners : 4,800 DM, civil servants : 6,800 DM, pensioners : 
2,900 DM), and to 12,700 DM for the employers (farmers : 3,400 DM, 
others : 22,000DM). A conservative estimate of the total property of 
private households would be 304,000 million DM for 1960, that is, 
5,700 DM per capita of the total population. 
For 1960 the distribution of private property by order of magnitude 
is as follows : 
460 households (= 0.0026% of the total) possessed over 10 
million DM; together, 4.01% of the total property. 
13,540 households (= 0.0758% of the total) possessed between 1 
and 10 million DM; together, 9.16% of the total property. 
291,000 households (== 1.627% of the total) possessed between 0.1 
and 1 million DM; together, 21.9% of the total property. 
17,585,000 households (= 98,295% of the total) possessed less than 
0.1 million DM; together 64.9% of the total property. 
20 ibid., p. 66. 
2 1
 D E LA CHEVALLERIE, O., op. cit., p. 22. 
2 2
 FÔHL, C. op. cit., p. 66. 
2 3
 KREELLE, W., J. SCHUNCK, J. SIEBKE, Uberbetriebliche Ertragsbeteiligung der 
Arbeitnehmer, op. cit., condensed translation of pp. 488-490. 
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This shows great inequality, but not a concentration of property in 
relatively few hands. Criticism could more readily focus on the distribution 
of industrial capital. 33% of this type of property belonged to households 
with a total property of more than 1 million DM. 80% of the property of 
households owning more than 1 million DM consists of capital in private 
enterprises. And this represents a significant concentration, considering 
that there were only 14,000 such households. 
The Increased Demand for Capital 
Technical progress and modem production methods demand an 
increasing amount of capital. When Karl Marx wrote « Das Kapital » the 
equipment required for a project in the residential field of the construc-
tion industry consisted of some wood for a scaffold, some vats for the 
mortar, some wheel-barrows, and perhaps a horse-drawn vehicle. 40 years 
ago capitalization per employée reached 450 DM in the residential cons-
truction field. Today in some parts of the same industry, 46,000 DM per 
employée are being spent24. The capital-labour ratio in West-German 
industry in gênerai reached an average of 12,800 DM per employée in 
1950. It rose to 26,200 in 1962. In the automobile industry the required 
amount per employée was tripled in the same time-span. A refinery 
constructed near Mannheim in 1964 required an investment of 240 mil-
lion DM but is run by only 300 employées (800,000 DM per employed 
person). 
THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Principles of the Social Market Economy 
( « Soziale Marktwirtschaft » ) 
The idea of a social market economy centers on the market. The 
participants in the economy plan to meet each other within the market in 
the form of « demand and supply » for différent goods and factors to 
agrée about contracts in freedom and self-responsibility 25. The factors of 
production (capital and labour) are generally allocated according to the 
conditions of supply and demand in this open pricing System ; in the same 
way the primary distribution of income is also determined by the laws of 
24
 LEBER, G., Vermôgensbildung in ^r6e/toe/*raer/mnd, Dokumentation, Band 
1 (Europàische Verlagsanstalt : Frankfurt/M, 1964), p. 17. Ail the following 
figures in this context are drawn from the same source. 
25
 PREISER, E., Nationalôkonomie Heute, (Beck : Munich, 1959) p. 42. 
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the market26. But in contrast to the classical liberalism the conditions and 
results of a functioning market economy are not necessarily accepted. 
The belief and trust in the optimal automatic self-direction of the free 
market economy is tempered27. The fallacy of « natural », mechanical 
harmonyM is replaced by active, « harmonious » 29 government inter-
vention in co-operation with ail groups in society. The classical30 concept 
is superseded and supplemented by the following four amendments : 
1.) A functioning free enterprise System - understood as the direction 
of production according to the urgency of needs - is not automatically 
stable, therefore an active stabilizing policy on the part of the government 
is necessary. 
2) The results of the market-process are not automatically accepted, 
especially with respect to the distribution of national income. The distri-
bution of income determined by the market has to be corrected by a 
secondary redistribution. But the redistribution has to occur without 
essential violations of the compétitive market forces within the System. 
3) It is not assumed that the interaction of market forces always 
secures full employment. The government has to hâve an active business-
cycle policy. This policy stimulâtes or slows down private demand — 
especially the demand for investment goods — and public demand as 
the need arises. In order to link the trade-cycle policy with the principles 
of the market economy, the government tries to accomplish the following 
three aims simultaneously : full employment, stable priées, and balance-
of-payments equilibrium. Thèse aims are often called the « magie triangle » 
because « sometimes some magie power seemed to be necessary to reach 
thèse ends simultaneously » 31 ; nevertheless, there is a guideline and an 
optimum balance between thèse aims which should be sought32. 
26
 MEINHOLD, H., lnvestivlohn und soziale Marktwirtschafu in : G. LEBER, 
Vermôgensbildung in Arbeitnehmerhand, Dokumentation, Band 3 (Europâische 
Verlagsanstalt : Frankfurt/M, 1965) p. 62. 
27 EUCKEN, W., Grundsàtze der Wirtschafispolitik, (Bern and Tiibingen, 1952) 
p. 200. Cf. also Mater et Magistra, Sozialenzyklika Papst Johannes XXIII, 15. 
Mai 1961 (Munich/Frankfurt/M) p. 19: «The économie and social Systems are 
not a resuit of compulsory, natural forces, they a r e . . . créations of human 
beings. . .» 
28
 ARNDT, E., Theoretische Grundlagen der Lohnpolitik, (Mohr : Tiibingen, 
1957) p. 7. 
2 9
 BOSCH, W., Vermôgensstreuung, op. cit., p. 162. 
30 See the définition of « classical économiste » in J. M. KEYNES, The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, (Macmillan : London, 1964) p. 3. 
31
 PREISER, E., Nationalôkonomie Heute, op. cit., p. 95. 
32
 MEINHOLD, H., lnvestivlohn und soziale Marktwirtschaft op. cit., p. 63. 
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4) As to the redistribution of income, the government should try to 
wield influence not merely by means of a secondary redistribution but 
also by means of affecting the underlying conditions of the income and 
property promoting process in accordance with acceptable social criteria. 
In order not to disturb the sound distribution of income according to the 
rules of a relatively free market, the government at first should confine its 
activity to means consistent with the essential prerequisites of the market. 
This can be attempted through more or less vigorous tax changes, foreign-
trade policy, etc. Only in the case of serious problems should strong and 
direct means — like subsidies — be applied, and then only as long as 
the period of disturbance continues or as long as a new adjustment to 
the changed situation can be expected. Any direct initiative by the govern-
ment should be reserved as an exception for emergencies. The primary 
distribution of income should be decided by the agents of collective 
bargaining. Union and management should acknowledge the objectives of 
the « magie triangle », and their duty should be performed in co-opera-
tion with the government. Only this co-operation will keep the social 
market economy in opération. Therefore this économie System can only 
be successful as long as none of the agents of collective bargaining or the 
government exceed their normal power. An undesirable encroachment 
occurs if the government détermines wages or if the social partners agrée 
to terms which jeopardize the économie policy of the government. 
In this concept of the social market economy the rôle and fonction 
of unions are enlarged from a straight-forward pressure group to that 
of participants in a nation-wide co-operative effort. According to this 
interprétation the labour movement has to cope successfully with two 
opposite périls, which were described in différent éditions of the Econo-
mist : On the one hand, the opinion was expressed that given three 
désirable ends, namely full employment, stable priées, and free labour 
movement, only two can be accomplished at the same time 33, and on the 
other hand, it was held that the modération of the British unions was 
responsible for the low productivity of the British industry 34. In both 
situations the unions are seen as the scapegoat : in the first instance a free 
and active labour movement is considered the basic cause of inflation or 
underemployment ; in the second, the unions are accused of failing to 
stimulate the economy through their inactivity. Labour organizations must 
somehow find the proper balance between thèse two extrêmes. 
33 Quoted by E. ARNDT, op. cit., (Préface). 
3 4
 COSER, L.A., Social Conflict and Social Change, British Journal of Socio-
logy, Vol. VIII,, No. 3 (1957) p. 198. 
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In considération of the question whether the idea of investment-
wages is compatible with the abovementioned principles of a social market 
economy, there are two problems especially worth noting : It is necessary 
a) to détermine whether investment-wages can be bargained collectively, 
and b) to discuss their compulsory aspect. 
a) Never before had collective agreements dealt with employée rémuné-
ration part of which was to be put under certain constraints in terms of 
its distribution. It was expected that the employers would claim that such 
a clause should not be the object of a collective agreement. Therefore, 
various légal scholars were asked to give their opinions on this matter. 
The situation was clarified when Parliament passed a law35 which enabled 
the agents of employers and employées to include in collective agreements 
a certain amount (maximum 312 DM per year), which the employer could 
pay free of profit — and wage taxes, and free of contributions to the 
social security system, // the employée was saving this income36. Under 
thèse conditions the majority of the légal studies made led to positive 
results as far as the employées were concerned 37. 
According to thèse investigations, investment-wages as such are 
constituent éléments of the wage package38. The goverament should not 
interfère if the « social partners » (fédérations of employers and of em-
ployées) corne to an agreement about investment-wages. 
b) The employers respected this décision after some hésitation; they 
finally accepted the confrontation. Their objections and those of strict 
adhérents to individualiste ideas then turned to the collective, compulsory 
aspects of the proposition. This problem still animâtes socio-political 
discussions today. 
Generally it is held that, as far as possible, savings should be made 
on a voluntary basis, Le., saving should be promoted by incentives or by 
35 The so-called «Second Property Accumulation L a w » (Zweites Vermô-
gensbildungsgesetz ) . 
36 BRAUN, K., wrote a report on this law : Saving Incentives Offered to 
West-German Workers, in : Monthly Labour Review, United States Department 
of Labour, Vol. LXXXVIII, No. 8, (August, 1965), pp. 971-973. 
37 For example : G. WEISSER, Vermôgensbildung und vermôgenswirksame 
Tarifvertràge ; A. KÔTTGEN, Eigentumspolitik als Gegenstand von Tarifvertrdgen in 
verfassungsrechtlicher Sicht ; G. WANNAGAT, Zur Vereinbarkeit des Leber-Planes 
mit der geltenden Rechtsordnung ; W. REUB, Arbeitsrechtliche Gesichtspunkte zum 
sogenannten Leber-Plan ; ail in : G. LEBER, Vermôgensbildung in Arbeitnehmer-
hand, Band 3, op. cit., pp. 123-136, 173-184, 185-202, 203-216 respectively. 
38 HÔHNEN, W., Die Vermôgenspolitischen Gesetze und Massnahmen in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutchland, (Bund-Verlag : Kôln, 1?68), p . 181. 
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the development of attractive modes of saving, by public relations work 
and better information39. An advertising campaign promoting savings 
would require tremendous financial resources, and even then would likely 
be relatively unsuccessful. Expérience ^ with the First Property Accumu-
lation Law confirms the reasoning that individualistic measures are in-
adéquate to achieve the desired broader distribution of property. Adhérents 
of the compulsory measure state that propaganda and incentives addressed 
to the individual propensity to save are overwhelmed by social incentives 
stimulating consumption 41. 
Besides pointing out thèse psychological aspects, scholars of political 
economy support the basic consistency of the compulsory aspect of invest-
ment-wages with the principles of a social market economy. Meinhold, 
for example, explains : « On the basis of our employment and growth-
rate oriented policy, realized by the means of easy money, the question 
of a completely free control over the distribution of the income is already 
answered »42. « Easy money » means an increase in the quantity of 
money. As a conséquence of each increase — for the sake of full em-
ployment — income receivers lose some control over the national product. 
Control is lost to the extent to which the increased quantity of money 
exceeds savings. A trend toward higher priées can be empirically reco-
gnized (the increased quantity of money always seems to tend to exceed 
the increase of supply). The winner is, at least at the beginning of the price 
increase, the entity of employers. The problem of income distribution is 
39 So, for example, H. MEINHOLD, Some Comments on lnvested Wages, op. 
cit., p. 91. 
40
 BRAUN, K., writes in the Monthly Labor Review, op. cit., p. 972 : « A 
1964 government survey indicated that in the three years 1961-63 relatively little 
use had been made of the law of July 12, 1961. Total payments for capital accu-
mulation of 67.5 million DM . . . were received by only 250,000 employées (110,000 
wage earners and 140,000 white collar workers), or 2% of the work force in the 
enterprises covered by the survey. (Thèse firms employed about two-thirds of 
the employées in the private economy) ». 
41
 WALLRAFF, H.J., Grenzen ethischer Gegenargumente, in : G. LEBER, Doku-
mentation, Band 3, op. cit., p. 148 : « Since the émancipation of the citizen de-
monstrated consumption was translated into social réputation. This fact has today 
become an essential connotation of our western world. Social strata with higher 
income can demonstrate this amount of consumption, which préserves or increases 
their social prestige, and, in spite of that consumption, they can save, too. But 
ail strata which lie under the middlé income of the society can only save without 
loss of social réputation if ail neighbours and colleagues save as much. The average 
citizen does not understand the modem philosophy, but he practises a vulgar form 
of existentialism... In this climate savings and investments will not be favoured, 
especially if there is nothing to begin with ». 
42
 MEINHOLD, H., Investivlohn und soziale Marktwirtschaft, in : G. LEBER, 
Dokumentation, Band 3, op. cit., p. 67. 
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raised as soon as we break with the principles of the classical economy. 
« The idea of investment-wages tries to realize this necessary connection 
not only in favour of the employers. In principle there is no différence, 
only the connection is more easily visible » 43. 
Meinhold's reasoning is already based on the modem theory of 
political economy : we hâve to dig a little deeper in the theory if we raise 
the question to what extent investment-wages can be applied in a growing 
economy given the aims of full employment and price stability. 
Income Distribution in a Growing Economy 
According to Keynes, « consumption is the sole end and the object 
of ail économie activity » u. The desires of consumers détermine the 
direction of the economy. If we demand more cars, then, there may be a 
temporary scarcity, but in the long run we will hâve more, not fewer cars. 
But the capacity even of an expanding economy is not unlimited. So much 
of a national economy should be used for the production of consumer-
goods, and so much for the production of investment goods. If one assumes 
that investments of a certain level and kind are essential to économie 
progress and growth, the following points are valid : 
1) Too much current consumption will absorb so much économie 
capacity that it thereby will diminish the possibility of économie growth 
and higher consumption in the future45. 
2) Too little current consumption46 will not stimulate any invest-
ment, because the présent capacity of the economy will be able to produce 
the demanded consumer-goods. The conséquence will be that the em-
ployées of the suppliers of investment-goods lose their employment, thus 
starting a deflationary tendency. 
Thèse assertions lead to the following conclusions : 
1) Consumption and investment together are limited by the total 
capacity of the economy. This capacity cannot be expanded instantly, 
but it can be expanded over time. 
« ibid., p. 69. 
4 4
 KEYNES, J.M., The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 
op. cit., p. 104. 
45 NELL-BREUNING, O.von, Sparen ohne Konsumverzicht ?, in : G. LEBER 
Vermôgensbildung in Arbeitnehmerhand Documentation, Band 3 op. cit., p. 50 
and cf. W. KRELLE, J. SCHUNCK, J. SIEBKE, Ûberbetriebliche Ertragsbeteiligung der 
Arbeitnehmer, op. cit., pp. 46-51. 
46 KEYNES, J.M., op. cit., for example, p. 325. 
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2) Over-consumption is as detrimental as under-consumption : too 
much consumption slows down économie growth and brings unemployment 
and déflation. 
If the government, in its endeavour to stimulate a suitable mix of 
consumption and investment, cornes to the conclusion that consumption 
should be diminished, then increased savings can be realized simultaneous-
ly. Saving simply means « non-consumption »47. Each saver restricts 
consumption and if the declined demand for consumer-goods. is not 
compensated by an increased demand for other goods, then production 
and employment within the national economy will be reduced. 
On the monetary side, saving means that money is taken out of 
circulation. But the banking system does not dépend for its crédit volume 
solely on the amount of savings deposits. If the banking system supplies 
the employer with crédit, then investment can occur independently of 
saving. Saving as such means dépression, investment as such means ex-
pansion. We may find in the additional investments made by employers 
with money borrowed from the banking system48 the compensation for 
any décline in demand induced by saving. The total demand, production, 
and employment remain constant if the additional investments are the 
same as the savings. 
Ail the statements made above are based on Keynes' « General 
Theory » and his method of « Income Analysis ». But we hâve to go 
beyond his static conception to recognize the continuing conséquences 
of investment in a dynamic, growing economy. We saw that investment 
as a part of total demand produces employment and income. This aspect 
of investment is called the « income effect » 49. Keynes exclusively confined 
his observations to this aspect of investment. But the major purpose of 
investment to the employer is to increase his capacity. This créâtes the so-
called « capacity effect » 50 of investment. The capacity effect will be 
visible with the beginning of the output of the newly finished equipment ; 
but will operate after a certain time-lag (time of construction) in contrast 
to the income effect. The income effect stimulâtes demand ; the capacity 
effect créâtes an increased potential supply. The latter will only be forth-
47
 MICHEL, H., Eigentumspolitik, (Mohr : Tùbingen, 1962) p. 31 and J.M. 
KEYNES, op. cit., p. 74. 
48 Increased taxes or public loans by the central bank would only resuit in 
a redistribution from one side to another : new savings could be balanced by new 
investments, but the original gap could not be filled. 
49 PREISER, EM Nationalôkonomie Heute, op. cit., p. 115. 
50 Ibid., p. 116. 
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coming if there is an increase in demand for the product in question. Hère 
we reach the crucial question : where would the demand for the potential 
supply increased by the capacity effect corne from ? The actual supply is 
only forthcoming if further investments are made. But once more, after a 
certain timelag, an increased capacity nécessitâtes a new income effect. 
Thus each investment calls for new investments. But not only that : the 
new investments hâve to take place at an appropriate rate. This rate of 
additional investments dépends on the following functions : 
1) the propensity to save, 
2) the propensity to invest, 
3) the capital or technical coefficient of production. 
We must also add an « equilibrium-equation » (the additional income 
should be equal to the additional production) because we are trying to 
avoid trade cycles and to establish a steadily growing economy. 
The capital or « technical coefficient » refers « to the quantities of 
the différent factors required, under given technical conditions of produc-
tion, to produce a given quantity of a certain good or commodity » 51, or 
in short, it means the technical ratio between investment and the increased 
production supplied. 
Thèse thoughts can be summarized in a simplified, domestic static 
model in equilibrium, as shown in Illustration I : 
In connection with the simplified model we can raise the following 
crucial question : Where is the point at which the distribution of income 
begins to be changed ? 
If the increase in wages is the sarne as the increase in overall product-
ivity, then only the potential demand for the increased supply (under 
constant priées) is created, the distribution of income is not changed. Or, 
in other words : if the wages increase to the same extent as the technical 
progress diminishes the costs per unit of output, then the ratio between 
wages and profit per unit of output is not changed ; the distribution of 
the social product between wages and profit remains the same. If the real 
savings of the wage-earners should be increased, then the wage-rate must 
exceed the increase in productivity. This includes a sacrifice on the part 
of the profit-receiver. As the employées hâve to renounce the so-called 
51 HANSEN, A., A Guide to Keynes, (McGraw-Hill : New York, 1953) p. 29. 
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ILLUSTRATION I 
A Schematic Portrayal of a Static Economie Model in Equilibrium 






1 = 25 
- ^ = 60 X T = 1 5 E 
" ^ ^ - QE = 15 ^ 
^ — ^ G 
S V. 
s = 25 
Symbols: 
V = Value of Output S = Saving Q = Employers' 
W = Wages Y = National Income Income 
WE = Wage Earners C = Consumption GE = Government 
E = Employers I = Investment Expenditures 
G = Government T = Taxes 
Equations: 
(A) Définition Equations : (1) Distribution Equation : Y = W + Q + r 
(B) Assumed Equation : I = S 
(2) Application Equation : Y = C+S+GE 
(3) Reproduction Equation : Y = C + I + G E 
« expansive wage policy » 52, a policy which expands the wages above 
the advance in productivity and gives to the employée free application 
(consumption) of the entire wage increase ; so the employers should be 
willing to accept a lowering of their profit. Whether or not they do so, 
they can in any case react in three ways : 
1) The employers may respond to decreased profits by creating an 
additional demand — of an amount équivalent to the investment-wages — 
52
 MARX, A., Die expansive Lohnpolitik in betriebswirtschaftlicher Sicht, in : 
Liiketaloudellinen Aikakauskirja (Journal of Business Economies), Helsinki, 1961, 
pp. 1-13. 
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for investment-goods. The saved investment-wages make crédits in the 
required quantity possible. The propensity to invest leads to an increase 
in the macroeconomic demand and permits a price —and profit increase 53. 
An investment expansion would demonstrate behaviour oriented toward 
macroeconomic rationality. 
It is possible to assume54 that employers may not act in accordance 
with macroeconomic rationality but rather in orientation toward micro-
economic profits and sales (microeconomic rationality). Since sales remain 
constant and profits decrease, the employers, according to this opinion, 
will not tend to invest. The behaviour of West-German employers during 
the dépression of 1966-67 confirmed this prédiction : during that time 
there was little propensity to invest, even though capital was easily 
obtainable. 
2) The employers' propensity to invest may decrease, and thus growth 
and employment may decrease, or 
3) The employers may increase priées, in order to pass on the additional 
costs. In the latter case the demand would not be big enough to purchase 
the présent supply at higher priées, because part of the increased wages are 
saved. In conséquence less produced goods can be sold and this — if 
the priées are not to be reduced — would lead to underemployment, 
which would force the government — according to the aims of the social 
market economy, especially « full employment » — to take stimulating 
measures. The gap in the demand would be closed and in this way the 
price increases would be sanctioned. 
AU thèse undesirable developments are possible and probable if the 
investment-wages start with a high amount. The danger is diminished in a 
growing economy, especially if the increasing investment-wages do not 
reach an amount which threatens a positive development of the profit. 
Based on our simple model, and under the assumption of Meinhold's esti-
mation of a growth-rate of 5 percent (without cumulation), a very sim-
plified expanding model (Illustration II) can demonstrate a simultaneous 
positive development of profit and investment-wages 55 : investment-wages 
(IW) start in the year 1 ; the normal wages (W) and the expenditures of 
the government (GE) increase with the same percentage as the social 
product. 
53 This, for example, is assumed by H. GIRSCH, Problème stabilisierungskon-
former Lohnpolitik, i n : Kyklos, Vol. XX (1967), pp. 157-159. 
54 BRUHN, N., Einkommenspolitik aïs Stabilisierungspolitik, in: Schriftenreihe des 
Osterreichischen Forschungsinstituts fur Sparkassenwesen, Vol. IX, No. 1, (1969), 
pp. 58-62. 
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A Schematic Portrayal 
ILLUSTRATION II 
of a Dynamic Economie Model ! in Equilibrium 
Year Y W Q GE IW 3+4+5+6 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 100 60 25 15 — 100 
1 105 63 25.5 15.75 0.75 105 
2 110 66 26 16.50 1.50 110 
3 115 69 26.5 17.25 2.25 115 
It is not possible for marginal enterprises to survive in this trend. 
They operate just at the margin of profitableness ; each decrease of profit 
jeopardizes their existence. In a pure market economy this is to be 
expected ; more than that, the expelling of the marginal opération is 
desired in favour of the more efficiently performing enterprises. If we 
pay any attention to the reality of the social market economy, then in the 
question of the closing of inefficient enterprises ail « rules of the market » 
seemed often to be neglected. Hère especially the term social market 
economy seems to become vague and diffusive. 
Whatever may be the actual behaviour of ail involved groups, the 
preceding remarks show with some certainty that the social market eco-
nomy can digest the application of investment-wages without price in-
creases and without jeopardizing full employment, if the investment-wages 
are introduced in modest proportions56. With respect to the distribution 
of property in favour of the employées, the use of investment-wages 
cannot be expected to lead to great short-term success ; significant changes 
can only be expected in the long run57. This fact éliminâtes investment 
wages as a means of expanding the influence of employées in a capitalistic 
economy for ail those58 who are interested in a short-term solution. One 
way of attaining such a short-term expansion of employée influence in 
55
 MEINHOLD, H., Investivlohn und soziale Marktwirtschaft, in : G. LEBER, 
Dokumentation, Band 3, op. cit., p. 73. 
56
 Meinhold estimâtes that at a growth-rate of 5% of the entire economy, a 
Vi% increase of the annual total wage income in the form of investment-wages is 
possible. H. MEINHOLD, Some Comments on Invested Wages, in : G. LEBER, Accu-
mulation of Assets for the Worker, op. cit., pp. 94-95. 
57
 ROTHSCHILD, K.W., Vermôgensbildungsplàne — Hoffnungen und lllusionen, 
in : Wirtschaftsdienst, Vol. VIII, No. 11, November, 1968. 
38 For example, O. VON NELL-BREUNING, Mitbestimmung, (Europâische Ver-
lagsanstalt. Frankfurt/M, 1968) p. 12. 
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private industry might be worker participation by law. The unions' 
demands for législative initiative pertaining to worker participation, and 
for measures intended to increase the amount of property in the hands 
of employées, are thus complimentary long- and short-term straté-
gies. The construction workers' union above ail is an adhèrent of the 
long-term solution. Their proposai and collective agreement pertaining 
to investment-wages wil be dealt with in the following chapter. 
Investment-wages in the West-German 
construction industry 
THE HISTORY OF THE FIRST COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT PERTAINING 
TO INVESTMENT-WAGES 
The Proposai of the Construction Union (Leber-Plari) 59 
PROGRAMME 
for the Promotion of Construction Workers' Savings 
The proposed arrangement is designed to promote the accumulation 
of assets for construction workers in order to provide an additional degree 
of security through the médium of personal property. 
To accomplish this aim the functions of the building trade's supple-
mentary pension office — an existing agency utilised by ail construction 
enterprises — should be expanded. 
Proposai for Use in a Collective Agreement 
A. Funding 
A collective agreement should stipulate that the employers shall 
provide 1.5 per cent of the aggregate of wages paid, for the purpose of 
building up assets for their employées. Thèse contributions shall be 
collected by the supplementary pension office and passed on to an agency 
yet to be established, hereinafter named « The Fund ». Thèse resources, 
*
9
 Authorized translation by the Construction Union, in : G. LEBER, Accumu-
lation of Assets for the Worker, op. cit., pp. 11-13. 
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however, are distinct from other contributions in that they neecl not be 
paid out in cash, but may be retained within the entreprise for investment 
purposes. 
The employer has the choice between several possibilities of raising 
thèse monies : 
1. The enterprise may dispose of the aggregate sum of its contributions 
as capital from outside sources ; in other words, a creditor-debtor 
relationship will be established between the Fund and the enterprise. 
The loan granted to the enterprise shall bear interest. 
2. The employer may convert this outside capital into the enterprise's 
own capital, resulting in a transfer of company shares to the Fund. 
The profit-sharing would then hâve to be handled within the frame-
work of the normal distribution of profits. 
3. The employer may pay over the contribution in cash to the supple-
mentary pension office for the benefit of the Fund. This alternative 
is intended to provide firms — especially those in a personal name — 
with the choice of disassociating the Fund from the enterprise, 
both as shareholder and as creditor. 
B. Function of the Fund 
The Fund shall hâve the function of administering claims and capital 
assets in a way similar to that used by investment firms. The Fund shall 
invest cash contributions so that they will yield profits and encourage 
building activity. In particular the Fund shall avail itself of the following 
courses of action : 
1. The resources may be turned over to construction firms for the 
purpose of additional capital investment, either as loans or authorised 
capital. 
2. Loans earmarked for spécifie purposes may be allocated for building 
projects of public interest ; this course of action would hâve to be 
linked with promoting a well-balanced building cycle and, inci-
dentally, a 12 months' full-time employment in the building trade. 
3. The resources may be made available as loans on easy terms to 
construction workers who intend to acquire their own houses ; this 
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measure would provide an additional incentive to those workers for 
building owner-occupied homes. 
C. Benefits Accruing to the Worker 
After the contributions paid over to his name hâve reached a certain 
amount the worker shall receive a share certificate in the value of the 
accrued sum. This share certificate shall represent his claim vis-à-vis 
the Fund. 
When the worker has reached retirement âge of when, being disabled, 
he has been granted a social insurance pension he may return his share 
certificate to the Fund in exchange for the accrued capital at compound 
interest. As an alternative he shall hâve the choice of retaining the interest-
bearing shares and even of transferring them by will. 
In exceptional cases the worker may be paid the accrued benefits at 
an earlier date. Pertinent détails shall be stipulated in the standing orders 
of the Fund. 
Frankfort/Main, 9th September, 1964 
The Collective Agreement and Us Side Effects 
Nine months after the first publication of this proposition of the 
IG Bau-Steine-Erden the first German collectively bargained programme 
for capital accumulation in the hands of employées was settled. The nego-
tiations very quickly led to the agreement ; both parties agreed to ask 
the Fédéral Ministry of Labour to extend the provision of the collective 
agreement to ail relevant employées in the construction industry. The 
extension was given on October 11, 1965, as expected. The agreement 
covers about 1.6 million employées, or about 7.5% of ail employées of the 
West-German economy in 1966 ^ ; it came into force on January 1, 1966. 
The agreement61 could be re-negotiated for the first time in the middle 
of 1966, any changes to be effective as of December 31, 1970. After that 
time notice to renegotiate could be given six months in advance of the 
60 Statistisches Jahrbuch, op. cit., p. 122. 
61 The text of the collective agreements has been published in : G. LEBER, 
Vermôgensbildung in Arbeitnehmerhand, Dokumentation, Band 4 (Europâische 
Verlagsanstalt : Frankfurt/M, 1966) pp. 49-51. 
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end of each year. The program comprises, in short, the following consti-
tuent parts : 
1.) Employers will grant any individual employée in the construction 
industry a benefit of 0.09 DM per working hour if the worker adds a 
contribution of 0.02 DM per working hour on his own initiative. 
2.) The individual employée has to choose the type of long term invest-
ment he wants. The contribution will be credited to a savings aœount or 
any other type of investment. The contribution is frozen for a five-year 
period. 
The following points in the agreement differ from the original propo-
sition put forward by the construction union : 
1.) The contributions to the program of employée capital formation are 
split into two parts. The employées are not automatically participants in 
the program ; they hâve to take the initiative and contribute a small part 
of their présent income. 
2.) The employées are not forced to transfer their money to a spécial 
« Fund ». They can sélect from alternative forms of investments and 
choose other organizations to save and to invest their income. 
3.) The contributions are frozen for a five-year period. 
An individual employée would accumulate 193.93 DM annually. 
After 5 years, he would hâve a capital accumulation of about 1,300 DM, 
including interest and the Fédéral Government bonus granted to any 
owner of a savings account not subject to withdrawal for at least 5 years 62. 
However, the demands of the union were not satisfied by this pro-
gram of investment-wages : within the same negotiation a « normal » wage 
increase of 6% of the basic wages plus 2.4% as equalization for a shorter 
working time — 42 hours per week during the summer, 40 during the 
winter — was gained. This separate agreement came into force on April 1, 
1965 63. 
62 Das Zweite Vermôgensbildungsgesetz, Eds. and Commentators : K. Fitting, 
& N. Hentrich, 3rd. Edition (Bank fiir Gemeinwirtschaft : Frankfurt/M 1967). 
63 Table III shows that investment-wage policy did not keep the union from 
pursuing an active policy in the sector of normal wage increases. 
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TABLE m 
Wages in the Main64 Construction Industry & 


























































































1. 4. 1957 
1.10. 1959 
1.10. 1962 






11.6 1.56 1.47 
3.4 1.61 1.52 
1.7 1.64 1.55 
3.8 1.70 1.61 
3.7 1.76 1.67 
2.05 1.80 1.71 
6.0 1.92 1.83 
3.8 2.04 1.95 
10.0 2.20 2.11 
3.7 2.29 2.20 
3.9 2.38 2.29 
2.3 2.44 2.34 
5.6 2.58 2.47 
10.3 2.87 2.76 
6.1 3.04 2.93 
3.0 3.13 3.02 
5.0 3.30 3.19 
9.3 3.62 3.51 
8.5 3.93 3.81 
5.3 4.14 4.01 
2.5 4.24 4.11 
0.9 4.28 4.15 
3.5 4.43 4.30 
6.5 4.72 4.38 
2.4 4.83 4.69 
1. 4. 1964 42 hours weekly 
1.4-31.10.65 — 42 
1.11. -31.3 — 40 
1.10. 1969 — 40 
64 Published by the Construction Workers' Union, Frankfurt/M, 2.6. 1969. 
65 The industry is divided into two groups : the « main » group (Bauhaupt-
gewerbe) and the «finishing» group (Ausbaugewerbe). The latter group com-
prises : plumbers, painters, electricians, glaziers, etc. 
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The union also used the time between May, 1965 (settlement) and 
January, 1966 (the effective date of the settlement) to found a new bank 
and to start an advertising campaign to persuade the employées to save 
their money there. The new bank is the successor of the proposed « Fund », 
called « Bank fiir Sparanlagen und Vermôgensbildung » (BSV) 66. The 
new BSV was founded with the financial support (10 million DM for a 
start) of the « Bank fiir Gemeinwirtschaft » (BfG) 67, which in turn was 
founded by the DGB (Fédéral Union Association). In the organ controlling 
the BSV the savers hâve the majority ** ; the employées vote, can be elected 
and share the profit ; high interest (53A%) is promised, and the initiating 
procédure is organized as simply as possible 69. 
A further side effect resulted from the fact that the agreement was 
made « under the condition that the Second Property Accumulation Law 
(2. Vermôgensbildungsgesetz) would corne into force on or before Sept. 
30, 1965 » 70, and that it would permit collective agreements on property 
accumulation. This clause gives législation the final responsibilty for the 
application of the collective agreement, and représenta an attempt to 
accelerate the législative procédure by stating a time limit. 
In a debate and subséquent vote the majority of the governing coali-
tion (at that time CDU/CSU and FDP) sided with the opposition (SPD) 
against the FDP (minority of the governing coalition) 71. As a resuit, the 
law demanded by the collective agreement was passed within the proposed 
time limit72. 
B) The Results of the Collective Agreement 
1) The Conséquences of Higher Costs for the Employers 
The effects of the collective agreement coincided with a gênerai 
dépressive tendency in the West-German economy. In the economy as a 
66 « Bank for Savings and Promotion of Property >. 
67 Grundstein, 16. JAHRGANG, F R A N K F U R T / M , Oct. 31 , 1965, p . 4. 
68 The control organ (« Aufsichtsrat ») consiste of 15 members. 8 of thèse 
are elected représentatives of the savers ; five are elected members of the employées 
of the bank, one is a représentative of the construction union (président of the 
union) , and one is a représentative of the top management (« Vors tand») of 
the BFG. 
69 Grundstein, op. cit., Oct. 31, p. 4. 
7 0
 LEBER, G., Dokumentation, Band 4, op. cit., p. 49. 
7 1
 The debate and the outcome of the voting are reproduced in LEBER, G., 
Dokumentation, Band 4, op. cit., pp. 88-163. 
7 2
 The law was passed on May 5, 1965 and was put into force retroactively 
as of April 1, 1965. 
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whole, this tendency reached its lowest period in the year 1967 (cf. Table 
IV) ; in the construction industry the turnover was still decreasing in 
1968 (cf. Table V). Besides the turnover, the number of firms (cf. Table 
V), the investments (cf. Table V) and the income of employers73 were 
reduced during the same period. 
TABLE IV 
Distribution of the National Product in Positive or Négative % 
Changes in Relation to the Antécédent Year 74 
% National Product 
+ 10 
0 • • • 1 
- 5 





(including undivided profit) 1 
0 • • - 1 
- 5 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
During the dépressive trend higher labour costs affected employers' 
incomes adversely : priées could not be raised, instead, they had to be 
lowered for the most part, because of keener compétition. When the boom 
set in — in the middle of the year 1968 at the latest — priées in the 
73 Figures about the employers' income im the construction industry are not 
available seperately. It may be assurned that their income followed the same trend 
as the gênerai development shown in Table IV. 
74 Statistisches Jahrbuch, op. cit., p. 497. 
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TABLE V 
Number of Firms, Investments and Turnover in the Main 










1964 66,610 42,617 2,649 
1965 66,802 44,375 2,470 
1966 66,736 46,878 2,022 
1967 66,198 44,329 1,993 
1968 65,422 38,112 not yet 
published 
TABLE VI76 
Development of the Number of Wage-Earners since 1962 
subdivided into German and Foreign Wage-Earners in 
the Main Construction Industry 
Year Wage- Changes Changes 
Earners, German in No. of Foreign in No. of 
excluding Wage- German Wage Wage- Foreign Wage-
Sept. apprentices Earners Earners Earners Earners 
1962 1,332,777 1,182,096 150,681 
1963 1,444,289 1,272,947 +90,851 171,342 +20,661 
1964 1,457,836 1,274,349 + 1,402 183,487 + 12,145 
1965 1,453,119 1,246,196 -28,153 206,923 +23,436 
1966 1,403,629 1,195,299 -50,897 208,330 + 1,407 
1967 1,284,031 1,151,013 -44,286 133,018 -75,312 
1968 1,334,308 1,189,590 + 38,577 144,718 + 11,700 
June 
1968 1,280,396 1,146,096 134,300 
1969 1,310,373 1,125,146 -20,950 185,227 +50,927 
75 Statistisches Jahrbuch, op. cit., pp. 245, 246 and 244 respectively. 
76 Published by the Construction Workers' Union, October 1969. 
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construction industry rose77, so that higher costs resulting from both 
normal wage increases and from investment-wages could be compensated. 
Because investment-wages were applied in one sector only of the entire 
national economy, their effects were not différent from those of normal 
wage increases : they did not dampen demand to a significant extent, so 
that the higher costs could be taken into account in the calculation of 
priées. 
The initiative of the construction workers' union was too modest 
in the context of the entire economy ; the spark of their sectoral initiative 
did not jump over to the other unions, so that no macroeconomic test of 
the investment-wages idea was possible. The dampening effects on demand 
resulting from the sectoral application of the idea could only be hypo-
thesized ; they did not become visible enough to be proven. 
The Significance of the Bank System 
According to the collective agreement the savings of the employées 
will be invested by a bank-system in co-operation with the employée, who 
has the ultimate choice of the type of long term investments he wishes. 
With this solution the question is raised whether it is to be expected that 
this System will direct the savings towards the most profitable enterprises. 
Access to the capital market is essentially more difficult for small 
and medium-size companies than for large organizations. The latter hâve, 
for example, the opportunity to place new stocks or bonds in the capital 
market, which the employée can purchase directly. Ail other financial 
actions will be directed by the bank system (including the new BSV), 
relying on the savings accounts of the employées. But the présent bank 
System has not succeeded in developing sufficient crédit for small and 
medium-size companies. In this way the investment-wages can contribute 
to directing the financial resources toward the big capital corporations. 
This tendency may be undesirable — especially from the viewpoint of 
the social market economy (the number of self-employed persons may 
further decrease) — as long as only the shortage of reasonable crédits 
puts the smallest firms at a disadvantage. 
The edge is taken off this danger, which redistributes the saved 
capital to the advantage of big capital corporations, by the Second Pro-
perty Accumulation Law. Tax réductions are granted to ail employers 
77 price index for industrial buildings: 1965: 112.8%; 1966: 115.9%; 
1967: 110.3%; 1968: 116.1% Statistisches Jahrbuch, op. cit., p. 348. 
390 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 26, NO 2 
with fewer than 50 employées78. They may deduct from their income 
tax 30% of the amount they contribute to their employées' capital accu-
mulation savings ; the amount they deduct, however, may not exceed 
800 DM yearly 79. 
Since 1965, the new BSV has succeeded in collecting the following 
savings : 80 
(in Million DM) 1965/66 1967/68 1968/69 
Savings 30.28 75.5 115.7 
Already granted 
government bonuses 0.09 2.3 11.1 
Total 30.37 77.8 126.8 
At the end of the first year of business, the BSV had about 230,00081 
savings accounts at its disposai, at the end of the second year, 226,500 82, 
at the end of the third year the savings accounts averaged about 510 DM 
each.83. 
The crédits given by the bank showed the following development : 84 
(in Million DM) 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 
Crédit volume 31.6 84.0 118.3 
78 This régulation is significant for the construction industry, since it has a 
large number of firms with few employées. The distribution of firms in the cons-
truction industry, by no. of employées, shows the following structures: (1966) . 











1000 and more 64 Statistisches Jahrbuch, op. cit. p. 243. 
79 Thus, if an employer pays his 5 employées investment-wages in the amount 
of 200 D M each, his taxable income is reduced by 1000 D M . In addition, he may 
deduct 300 D M ( 3 0 % ) from his taxes. 
80 Bank fur Spareinlagen und Vermôgensbildung AG, Bericht ûber das Ges-
chàftsjahr 1967/68, p. 7. 
81 Bank fur Spareinlagen und Vermôgensbildung, AG, Beright ûber das Ges-
chàftsjahr 1965/66, p. 7. 
82 Bericht Uber das Geschàftsjahr 1966/67, op. cit., p. 6. 
83 Bericht ûber das Geschàftsjahr 1967/68, op. cit., p. 7. 
84 md., p. 7. 
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Most of thèse crédits were given to the construction industry. The 
following table shows the distribution of crédits in the year 1966/67 : 
TABLE VII85 















The BSV paid 6% interest on savings accounts up to Jan. 31, 1967. 
Thereafter it joined the gênerai trend toward lower interest rates : from 
February 1 to June 30, 1967, it paid 5Vi%, and since July 1, 1967, it has 
paid 5% 86. During the first three years of business ail accounts not subject 
to withdrawal for 2Vi years received an additional interest bonus ot 3A%. 
In 1966 the BSV interest rates were higher than those of most other 
banks. As far as crédits were concerned, the bank did not contrive any 
new forms — such as might hâve favoured, for example, small and 
middle-sized businesses. In May, 1968, the BSV, in co-operation with 
the « Allegemeine Hypthekenbank AG » (which, like the BSV, is also 
a daughter of the Bank fiir Gemeinwirtschaft AG) began to give cheap 
mortgages. By the end of the year 1967/68 mortgages totalling 18.9 
million DM had been granted 87. 
Thèse figures show that the BSV has not grown to a size that 
would provoke the opponents of the unions to speak of a « silent socia-
85 Bericht tiber das Geschàftsjahr 1966/67, op. cit., p. 7. 
86 Ibid., p. 7. 
8 7
 Bericht iiber das Geschàftsjahr 1967/68, op. cit., p. 7. 
1) Construction 
2) Public Utilities 
3) Minerai Oils 
4) Steel, Machinery & Vehicles 
5) Electrical Engineering, 
Précision Tools 
6) Textiles, Leather Goods 
7) Furniture 
8) Other Industries 
9) Wholesalers & Retailers 
10) Public Institutions 
11) Others 
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lization » as they did with référence to the « Fund » proposed by the 
Leber-Plan. 
The Reaction of the Employées 
Since investment-wages can be deposited at any bank, it is difficult 
to détermine the exact number of people making use of this plan. Up to 
January, 1966, about 40% of the 1.6 million employées in the construc-
tion industry had applied to participate88»89. Organized employées (about 
30% of the employées in the construction industry are members of the 
industrial union) make significantly greater 90 use of the investment-wages 
programme than their non-organized colleagues. 
The whole capital accumulation System will be inefficient and even 
dangerous (inflation push), if the majority or even many of the partici-
pating employées withdraw the blocked amount and consume it. Three 
variables seem important for the saving-education process : 1) the âge 
of the saver 2) the amount of the accumulated savings, and 3) habi-
tuation to dealing with capital in the System of banks and the capital 
market. The maturity deriving from a higher âge does not develop saliently 
within 5 years, and to make the employée familiar with the capital market 
is perhaps a task which exceeds the short-term means of the banks, 
including the new BSV. For 20 years the banks hâve been trying without 
much success to gain a large number of workers as customers. Only the 
amount of the saved income seems likely to stimulate stronger ties between 
employées and banks. However, the concrète amount of 1,300 DM is 
relatively small91 and therefore perhaps still too little. The impression 
that an amount of this order of magnitude will not promote a new saving 
habit is enforced if we compare this amount with the priées of the objects 
of the workers' current purchasing incentives : for instance, télévision 
sets (black and white) : about 750 DM ; automobiles (small « Volks-
wagen ») : about 5,000 DM ; automatic washing machines : about 1,200 
DM. The 1,300 DM seem too closely related to the price of the preferred 
goods of the current socially imposed living standard. 
88
 LEBER, G., Dokumentation, Band 4, op. cit., p. 244. 
89 « Since then about 45 collective agreements hâve been made ; however, they 
hâve increased the number of employées affected by only 0.1 million». F r o m : 
« Das zweite Vermôgensbildungsgesetz, K. FITTING, V. HENTRICH, op. cit., p. 14. 
90 In Grundstein, Oct. 31, 1965, op. cit., a participation of 80% oir organized 
employées was predicted. This figure was confirmed in a personal discussion with 
union officiais in November, 1969. 
91 A bricklayer, for example, may hâve an income close to 1,500 DM monthly, 
including overtime and moonlighting for private housebuilders. 
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Contrary to thèse hypothetical statements, which predict a « con-
sumption push » 92, a survey 93 of a représentative sample made by the 
« Institut fur Angewandte Sozialwissenschaften » in June, 1965, showed 
that more than half of those interviewed (52% ) do not intend to with-
draw their savings accounts at the end of five years ; about of fifth (18% ) 
is undecided, and almost one third (30%) declared that they intend to 
spend the money for consumption. Of the 52% intending to continue 
saving, 27% wanted to save toward a house, 2/s for their old âge or for 
rainy days, and Vs for their children. 
Whatever may be the actual plans of the individuals involved, the 
following circumstances hâve delayed the potential consumption and in-
flation push and hâve spread it over a longer period of time : On De-
cember 23, 1966, a law was passed cutting down on saving incentives. 
The compulsory duration of gênerai savings contracts was extended from 
5 to 6 years, and that of instalment savings plans from 6 to 7 years. 
In an instalment savings contract, the saver agrées to deposit, at 
least every three months for 6 years, a certain constant amount. Seven 
years after the first deposit, the total saved amount plus interest and 
government bonuses is made available to the saver for his free disposai. 
In a gênerai savings contract, deposits can be made irregularly during the 
year, and there is no fixed amount to be deposited. Six years after the 
end of any year, only the amount aggregated in that year can be with-
drawn without loss of the tax and bonus advantage. 
As a rule, investment-wages are deposited in instalment savings 
accounts. If an instalment is not paid — which may easily happen in the 
construction industry because of high turnover and layoffs during the 
winter months —, the contract is changed to a gênerai savings contract. 
Since the latter releases only the annual deposits ( + interest, + bonuses) 
after six years, significantly smaller sums of money are placed in the 
hands of the employées than in the case of the originally advertised ins-
talment savings contract. 
It remains to be seen how the employées will react when they realize, 
perhaps not before the end of the 5-year duration of the collective agree-
ment, that their instalment savings contract has had to be changed to a 
92 We may assume that a certain part of the accumulated savings will be 
left in the bank out of habit. Cf. Katona's distinction between « genuine décisions » 
and « habituai hebavior » in G. KATONA, Psychological Analysis of Economie 
Behaviour, First McGraw Hill Paperback Edition, (New York, 1963) p. 49. 
93
 Reproduced in : G. LEBER, Dokumentation, Band 4, op. cit., pp. 53-57. 
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gênerai savings contract. The BSV and the unions are aware of this danger 
of disappointment, and consequently they plan to intensif y their informa-
tion service. 
The union expects that the investment-wages programme will become 
more and more popular as employées watch their accounts growing, with-
out the necessity of any large personal sacrifices, and can tell their collea-
gues about it. The growth of his savings account is the aspect always vi-
sible to the worker — whenever he gets his bank statement in the mail — 
even if the dampening effect on demand and on priées does not suffice 
to protect thèse savings from a potentially inflationary tendency. 
LE SALAIRE D'INVESTISSEMENT : PRINCIPES 
ET MISE EN PRATIQUE 
Dans son sens le plus large, le salaire d'investissement est cette partie du 
salaire des travailleurs qui ne peut être dépensée pour la consommation pendant 
un certain temps, parce qu'il est placé pour eux dans l'économie sous forme de 
capital. Les discussions sur ce sujet en Allemagne ont démontré que cette théorie 
peut être appliquée selon plusieurs processus et de diverses façons. L'objectif est 
d'accroître la richesse des travailleurs de façon à leur apporter une plus grande 
sécurité. En plus de cet objectif à caractère individuel, le salaire d'investissement 
vise une fin sociale : permettre à tous les agents de l'économie de bénéficier du 
produit national et diminuer ainsi les écarts économiques. L'épargne individuelle, 
à elle seule, n'a pas réussi à donner aux travailleurs une part plus grande de 
l'ensemble de la propriété nationale. C'est à cette lacune que veut pallier la théorie 
du salaire d'investissement. 
Une partie de l'augmentation de salaire ne devrait pas être versée aux 
travailleurs car elle contribuerait à les pousser à dépenser mais elle serait retenue 
et convertie en épargnes pour de l'investissement. L'épargne individuelle temporaire 
et obligatoire semble la seule façon de développer chez les travailleurs une 
« éducation capitaliste ». Toutefois, il vaut la peine de payer ce prix qu'à la 
condition que les avantages du salaire d'investissement l'emportent sur ces incon-
vénients à l'intérieur du processus économique. Cette théorie du salaire d'investisse-
ment concorde bien avec les principes et les facteurs fonctionnels de l'économie 
sociale de marché qui prévaut en République fédérale d'Allemagne. 
LES FONDEMENTS DU SALAIRE D'INVESTISSEMENT 
Deux ans après la mise en vigueur de l'économie sociale de marché., en 1948, 
le Conseil scientifique indépendant des affaires économiques du gouvernement 
fédéral en vint à la conclusion que la distribution de la propriété était très inégale 
dans le pays. Pendant environ 40 ans, depuis 1925, la part du revenu national total 
allant aux travailleurs était d'environ 40%. Cependant depuis 1960, cette part a 
augmenté chaque année, jusqu'à 65.4% alors que celle des employeurs diminuait 
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de 39.2% en 1960 à 34.6% en 1965. Malgré cela, 2.8 millions de personnes (17%) 
possédaient 75% de toute la propriété dans le pays. 
Les progrès technologiques et les méthodes modernes de production requièrent 
un capital toujours croissant. La proportion de capital selon le travail dans 
l'industrie de la RFA en général a atteint une moyenne de 12,800 DM par employé 
en 1950. Celle-ci a augmenté à 26,200 DM en 1962. 
PRINCIPES DE L'ÉCONOMIE SOCIALE DE MARCHÉ 
Le principe de l'économie sociale de marché est fondé sur le marché. Cependant, 
contrairement au principe classique du libéralisme, les conditions et les résultats 
d'une économie de marché qui fonctionne ne sont pas nécessairement et automa-
tiquement acceptés. Le gouvernement intervient de façon active en coopération avec 
tous les groupes sociaux afin de suppléer à une harmonie naturelle et automatique. 
Le concept classique est modifié et complété de la façon suivante. 
Le système de fonctionnement de la libre entreprise, compris comme orientation 
de la production selon les besoins du marché, n'est pas automatiquement stable ; 
dès lors une politique de stabilisation de la part du gouvernement est nécessaire. 
Les résultats du processus du marché ne sont pas automatiquement acceptés, 
spécialement si l'on considère la répartition du revenu national. Dès lors il faut 
une redistribution du revenu, mais celle-ci doit se faire sans qu'il y ait nécessai-
rement des atteintes aux forces compétitrices à l'intérieur du marché. 
L'interaction de forces du marché n'assure pas le plein emploi ; aussi le gouver-
nement doit-il avoir une politique active de supervision des affaires. Il essaie 
d'atteindre simultanément ces trois buts : plein emploi, stabilité des prix et 
équilibre de la balance des paiements. Il s'agit de trouver un équilibre entre trois 
choses. 
Le gouvernement devrait se servir de son influence pour effectuer une 
meilleure redistribution du revenu. Ainsi, pour ne pas perturber une saine distri-
bution du revenu, si on s'en tient aux lois du marché libre, le gouvernement 
devrait en premier lieu utiliser des mesures moins sévères que des augmentations 
de taxes et qu'une politique du commerce extérieur; il devrait garder pour les cas 
très sérieux les moyens puissants indirects comme les octrois et ce, aussi longtemps 
que les difficultés subsistent. Il faudrait réserver uniquement pour les cas d'extrême 
urgence les interventions directes du gouvernement. Il faudrait la coopération des 
syndicats et de la direction des entreprises pour réaliser les objectifs gouvernementaux. 
Cette coopération seule peut permettre à l'économie sociale de marché de 
fonctionner. Un accroc fort indésirable se produit si le gouvernement détermine 
le salaire ou si les partenaires sociaux s'entendent sur des salaires et conditions de 
travail qui mettent en péril la politique du gouvernement. Selon cette conception 
de l'économie sociale du marché, le rôle et les fonctions des syndicats sont étendus. 
De simples groupements de pression, ils deviennent les participants dans un effort 
coopératif à la grandeur du pays. Toutefois il existe des dangers latents à cette 
nouvelle conception des syndicats. 
Les trois questions qui se posent sont les suivantes : est-ce que le principe du 
salaire d'investissement est compatible avec la théorie de l'économie sociale du 
marché ? Est-ce que le salaire d'investissement peut être intégré aux négociations 
collectives ? Quelle est sa force coercitive ? 
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a) Jamais auparavant les conventions collectives n'avaient déterminé l'utilisation 
obligatoire d'une partie de la rémunération des travailleurs. Le Parlement adopta 
la « Seconde loi d'accumulation du capital » qui autorisait les représentants des 
employeurs et des employés à inclure dans les conventions collectives un certain 
montant que l'employeur pouvait payer en étant exempté des taxes sur les 
profits et les salaires de même que des contributions pour la sécurité sociale, 
à condition que ce revenu des travailleurs serve à l'investissement. 
Plusieurs juristes ont émis l'opinion que ce système était légal et en sont 
venus à la conclusion que le salaire d'investissement était partie intégrante de la 
rémunération et que le gouvernement ne devrait pas s'en mêler. 
b) Après quelques hésitations, les employeurs se rangèrent à cette décision. Leurs 
préoccupations s'orientèrent sur les aspects de coercition collective de la propo-
sition. En général, on soutint que l'épargne devait être volontaire, encouragé par 
des stimulants, etc. Toutefois, l'expérience de la « Première loi sur l'accumulation 
du capital» avait démontré que les mesures à caractère individuel n'étaient pas 
suffisantes pour en arriver à la redistribution désirée de la propriété. De plus, 
la publicité poussant à la consommation l'emportait beaucoup sur les encoura-
gements à épargner. Dans quelle mesure, la théorie du salaire d'investissement 
peut-elle être appliquée dans une économie en croissance si l'on ne perd pas 
de vue les objectifs de plein emploi et de stabilité des prix ? Il faut conserver un 
équilibre entre la consommation, l'investissement et l'épargne, afin de pousser 
le plein emploi et le développement et encore prévenir les tendances inflation-
nistes et la récession de l'économie. 
LE SALAIRE D'INVESTISSEMENT DANS L'INDUSTRIE DE LA 
CONSTRUCTION OUEST-ALLEMANDE 
Le syndicat de la construction avait préparé un plan de salaire d'investissement 
(Plan Leber) qui aurait utilisé l'Office des rentes supplémentaires de l'industrie 
de la construction après avoir accru ses fonctions. 
Selon ce plan, la convention collective aurait statué que les employeurs 
verseraient 1.5% de la masse salariale payée en vue de constituer un capital pour 
leurs employés. Les contributions seraient perçues par l'Office des rentes supplé-
mentaires. Elles seraient distinctes des autres et seraient mises dans un fonds 
spécial. Il ne serait pas nécessaire qu'elles soient payées en argent mais elles 
pourraient être retenues dans l'entreprise sous forme d'investissement. Ce fonds 
fonctionnera suivant les procédés administratifs ordinaires qu'utilisent les sociétés 
de financement. Il devra investir les contributions en argent comptant de façon à 
ce qu'elles rapportent des bénéfices et qu'elles suscitent l'activité dans la construction. 
Ses ressources devront être affectées à des entreprises de la construction afin que 
celles-ci possèdent plus de capital d'investissement, soit sous forme de prêts ou 
d'actions. L'argent pourra aussi être utilisé pour des prêts destinés à des projets 
spéciaux d'intérêt public ; il pourra encore être prêté à des travailleurs de la 
construction afin de leur permettre d'acheter ou de construire leur propre maison. 
Quand les contributions auront été versées, le travailleur recevra une part qui 
représentera ses droits dans le fonds. Lorsque le travailleur prendra sa retraite ou 
deviendra impotent, il peut retourner au fonds sa part en échange de son capital 
accru avec l'intérêt composé. Dans les cas exceptionnels, le travailleur peut 
recevoir ce qui lui est dû à une date antérieure. 
LE SALAIRE D'INVESTISSEMENT : PRINCIPES ET MISE EN PRATIQUE 397 
C'est en 1965 que fut négociée pour la première fois une convention collective 
comprenant un plan d'accumulation de capital pour les travailleurs. Les deux 
parties se sont entendues pour étendre cet accord à tous les travailleurs dans 
l'industrie de la construction. La convention s'applique à près de 1.6 million de 
travailleurs, soit environ 7.5% de tous les travailleurs ouest-allemands en 1966. 
Voici quelques-unes des parties de l'accord : 
les employeurs accordent à chacun des travailleurs dans l'industrie de la cons-
truction une prime de 0.09 DM par heure de travail effectuée si le travailleur 
en fournit ; le travailleur peut choisir la sorte d'investissement à long terme qu'il 
désire, lequel sera immobilisé pour une durée de 5 ans. 
Un individu aura ainsi une accumulation de capital d'environ 1,300 DM après 
5 ans, ceci incluant l'intérêt et la prime que le gouvernement fédéral garantit à 
tout épargnant ayant un compte d'épargne bloqué pour 5 ans. 
Toutefois, les demandes syndicales dépassaient ce salaire d'investissement : au 
cours de la même négociation ils ont obtenu un accroissement normal de salaire 
de 6% plus 2.4% de compensation pour la diminution de la semaine de travail 
durant l'hiver. 
Le syndicat fonda une nouvelle banque entre mai 1965 et janvier 1966 et 
commença une campagne de publicité afin de persuader les travailleurs d'y placer 
leur argent. Le conseil d'administration de cette nouvelle banque (BSV) compte en 
majorité les épargnants ; les travailleurs votent, peuvent être élus et partagent les 
bénéfices ; on y promet un fort taux d'intérêt. 
Les effets de cette convention collective coïncidèrent avec un mouvement général 
de dépression de l'économie ouest-allemande, qui atteignit son point le plus bas 
en 1967. On a connu alors une baisse dans les investissements, le nombre des 
entreprises et le revenu des employeurs. Pendant cette dépression, les coûts de travail 
influencèrent de façon nocive le revenu des employeurs. Lors de la reprise, au milieu 
de 1968, les prix dans l'industrie de la construction se sont élevés. Parce que le 
salaire d'investissement avait été appliqué à un seul secteur, ses effets ne furent 
pas différents de ceux d'une augmentation normale de salaire ; ils n'influencèrent 
pas la demande d'une façon importante. 
Les épargnes des travailleurs doivent être investis dans une banque où les 
travailleurs eux-mêmes ont le choix ultime du type de placement à long terme 
qu'ils désirent. Mais est-ce que ce régime ne dirigera pas les épargnes vers les 
entreprises les plus profitables ? La voie d'accès aux marchés des capitaux est 
beaucoup plus difficile pour les petites et moyennes entreprises que pour les grandes. 
Ce genre de banque n'a pas réussi à accroître suffisamment le crédit pour les petites 
et moyennes entreprises. De cette façon le salaire d'investissement contribue à 
diriger les ressources financières vers les grandes entreprises et avec la rareté des 
crédits, les entreprises les plus petites sont désavantagées. Ce danger est mitigé par 
la « Seconde loi d'accumulation du capital ». Des réductions d'impôt sont accordées 
à tous les employeurs ayant moins de 50 employés. Cette disposition est significative 
dans l'industrie de la construction puisqu'un très grand nombre d'entreprises ont 
peu d'employés. 
mnr . 
Jusqu'à janvier 1966, environ 40% des 30.6 millions de travailleurs de l'industrie 
de la construction avaient demandé de participer à ce programme. Les travailleurs 
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membres du syndicat participent beaucoup plus au programme que leurs confrères 
non syndiqués. Le programme serait inopérant ou même dangereux si la plupart 
ou seulement plusieurs des employés retiraient leurs économies. Un sondage effectué 
en 1965 a montré que 52% des travailleurs interrogés n'avaient aucunement l'intention 
de retirer leur compte d'épargne au bout de 5 ans ; 18% ne savaient pas et 30% 
dirent qu'ils allaient dépenser cet argent. Quels que soient les plans actuels des 
travailleurs concernés, les circonstances suivantes ont différé la consommation 
éventuelle et la poussée de l'inflation et l'ont répartie sur une plus longue période 
de temps. En décembre 1966, une loi a été passée pour restreindre les stimulants 
à l'épargne. La durée obligatoire des contrats d'épargne à long terme a été portée 
de 5 à 6 ans et celle d'un contrat d'épargne par versement, de 6 à 7 ans. 
Dans un contrat d'épargnes par versements, l'épargnant accepte de déposer au 
moins à tous les trois mois pendant 6 ans un certain montant d'argent. Sept ans après 
le premier dépôt, le montant total des épargnes, plus la prime du gouvernement, lui 
est remis pour qu'il en dispose comme il l'entend. Dans un contrat général d'épargne, 
les dépôts peuvent être faits plus régulièrement durant l'année et il n'y a pas de 
montant fixe qui doit être déposé. Six ans après la fin de chaque année, seulement 
le montant accumulé durant cette année peut être retiré sans perdre les avantages 
des diminutions d'impôt et de la prime. 
Il reste à voir ce que les travailleurs diront lorsqu'ils sauront que ces 
contrats d'épargnes par versements devront être changés en contrat général d'épargne 
à long terme. La BSV et les syndicats sont conscients de ce danger et de cette 
déception possible. Les syndicats espèrent que ce programme de salaire d'investis-
sement deviendra de plus en plus populaire lorsque les travailleurs verront leurs 
économies augmenter, même si les effets restrictifs sur la demande et les prix 
ne réussissent pas à protéger suffisamment ces épargnes d'une tendance inflationniste 
possible. 
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